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To inform or not to inform: How should the
surgeon proceed when the patient refuses to
discuss surgical risk?
Lorraine F. Corfield, Brighton, UKA 67-year-old man presents with a 6.9-cm juxtare-
nal aneurysm that is unsuitable for endovascular stent-
grafting. After a discussion in the outpatient clinic of
the risk of rupture, the patient agrees that the vascular
surgeon should perform an open abdominal aneurysm
repair. The patient understands that this is a major
operation involving an abdominal scar and that his
aneurysmal aorta will be replaced with a prosthetic
graft to prevent aneurysm rupture. Nevertheless, he
adamantly refuses to hear about or to discuss the risks
of the procedure. The patient states that he needs the
repair and wishes to proceed with surgery because he
believes that all his doctors think it is best for him to do
so. He claims that since he will ultimately undergo the
operation anyway, any discussion of risks will cause him
and his family unnecessary anxiety. The patient is com-
petent to consent to the operation and agrees to sign as
many documents as needed, stating again that he does
not wish to know the risks and that he will take no legal
action against the surgeon or the hospital should a
properly conducted operation result in a poor outcome
of which the patient would normally have been in-
formed. The hospital legal counsel confirms that medi-
colegally it is reasonable to proceed in this individual
case. Nevertheless, the vascular surgeon has some ethi-
cal concerns. How should he proceed?
A. Proceed with surgery.
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risks with the patient, but discuss the risks with his
next-of-kin (against the patient’s expressed wish).
C. Accept that the patient does not want to know all the
risks but insist on telling him of the major risks, partic-
ularly death and end-stage renal failure.
D. Attempt to evaluate which values are important to the
patient and disclose risks accordingly.
E. Refuse to operate but refer for a second opinion.
To consider this issue, it is necessary to first assess why
risk disclosure is deemed important (legal issues aside). The
generally accepted reason is that it increases patient auton-
omy and allows the patient to make a decision that is truly
in his best interests. The reasoning behind this is that a
competent individual is the best judge of his own best
interests. A provisio here, however, is that where the knowl-
edge gap is large, the individual may be less well placed than
the surgeon to decide what course of action is in his or her
best interests. This is the situation here: the patient does
not want the information he needs to make a truly auton-
omous decision. In this situation, however, all are agreed
that he should have the operation. The surgeons believe
this is the best course of action because their superior
knowledge of the risks and benefits tells them that surgery
is in the patient’s best medical interests. They cannot,
however, truly assess whether it is in his overall best inter-
ests taking into account individual psychological and social
aspects. The patient has decided that surgery is the appro-
priate course because he trusts his doctors.
Although risk disclosure is accepted as good practice,
patient refusal or unwillingness to discuss risks does regu-
larly occur. When the patient is competent to give valid
consent and understands the aim and general nature of the
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possible for a self-determining individual—without know-
ing the risks—to state that he does not want to know what
the risks of surgery are. For example, if he is not aware that
end-stage renal failure is a possibility, how can he autono-
mously state that this (and every) risk will not affect his
decision to undergo surgery?
Andorno1 writes that the right not to know is an
expression of autonomy, yet recognizes the dilemma: “the
main practical objection to the right not to know is that in
order to decide not to receive some information, the person
should previously be informed of the possibility of having a
particular health risk. Now this is precisely what the indi-
vidual wanted to avoid.”
Respect for patient autonomy rightly has a large influ-
ence on the practice of modern medicine. Thus, if one
accepts the desire not to know is truly autonomous, it is
morally acceptable and even perhaps obligatory not to insist
on informing the patient of the risks. Proceeding in the
absence of risk discussion could be justified by the concept
that the patient has sacrificed his autonomy in the decision
process by refusing to discuss risks—in fact, he has auton-
omously sacrificed his autonomy!—and has accepted that
his treatment should be planned according to the principle
of beneficence. Provided that the proposed surgery is held
in good faith to be in his best interests, this is a morally
acceptable way forward. Some may suggest this has pater-
nalistic overtones, but accusations of paternalism are unjus-
tified because it is the patient who has sacrificed his auton-
omy in this one area rather than the surgeon overriding his
autonomy.
Furthermore, issues of privacy and liberty are raised if
the request for ignorance is unheeded. It is acceptable for
the patient to sacrifice his autonomy as an exercise of his
liberty. The doctor restricts the patient’s liberty by acting
against the request not to know. Laurie2 argues that the
choice not to be informed turns on “psychological privacy
which can be invaded by unwarranted disclosures of infor-
mation.”
The patient in this scenario has chosen to entrust the
decision to his doctors. As they think it is the best option, so
does he. This is consistent with a model of entrustment
described by McKneally et al3after interviewing patients
who had undergone major surgery. The patients in the
study rejected the concept of weighing risks and benefits
and other processes aimed to maximize their autonomy
because they felt it was inappropriate to themselves as
patients. They were also resigned to the risks of treatment,
thought that “analyzing risks was irrelevant to their deci-
sion,” and accepted the expert recommendation to consent
to surgery. In essence, the patients in the study universally
trusted “the competence and willingness of their surgeons
to make good treatment decisions on their behalf.”3 Al-
though this was a small study, the authors concluded that it
was logical to apply the delegation of decision-making to
another in the doctor-patient relationship.
The amount of information that should be disclosed to
any patient to allow decision-making is debatable. If infor-mation about every risk is fully discussed, the patient may
be overwhelmed and very alarmed, and may even lead to
withdrawal of consent if fear impinges on the patient’s
ability to make a sensible and autonomous decision.
Schwartz et al4 write that “[p]atients can be said to have a
right to any information they require to make a reasoned
decision about their health.” On this view, the patient in
our scenario needs no further information because he has
decided to have the operation regardless of the risks. Al-
though his decision is not based directly on the balance of
risks according to his personal values and higher order
desires, there is certainly clear reasoning behind it.
The caveat here is whether his perception of the situa-
tion is correct. Does he understand that there is almost
certainly only one realistic option, although the risks may
be high?5 In this case, it would appear he does. He intends
to have operation anyway (reading between the lines he is
resigned to it being the only option) and he knows that the
risks are high because he believes disclosure would cause
him and his family anxiety. This could be explored with the
patient a little further as necessary by asking, for example,
“do you think this is a major operation with serious risks?”
An alternative approach looks at the cognitive under-
standing of the operation and risks involved (accepting that
certain risks may eventuate).6 Cognitive understanding
acknowledges that each patient will place differing worth or
emphasis on each favourable or unfavorable outcome when
weighing a decision, depending on individually held values.
This is an area that can be useful to explore if a patient is
having difficulty deciding whether to go ahead with surgery
or which option to choose. By directly asking questions
about what is important to the patient with each issue they
are asked to consider, McCullough et al6 state that the
surgeon should “attempt to discern patterns of values in
conversation with the patient” and that in this way may help
“patients to connect otherwise unarticulated concerns.”
This will promote individual autonomy.6
Theoretically this is appealing, although in practice
would be extremely time-consuming. It is also open to
conscious or unconscious bias and possible manipulation
by the surgeon, who will almost inevitably believe that
surgery is the best option given that he has, by this stage,
recommended it as the best or a reasonable option.
Furthermore, one of the cornerstones of autonomy is
that it is individual, and even those who know us best and
know our values cannot make decisions on our behalf that
have equal autonomous weight with our own. This ap-
proach then falls back on acting in the best interests of those
who cannot or will not make an autonomous decision. It is
not, after all, an autonomy-promoting exercise but a deeper
assessment of what may be in an individual’s best interests.
In a few cases, however, the discussion may promote au-
tonomy in that the patient develops greater awareness of
underlying values, but to suggest that this occurs regularly
may be overly optimistic.
Does it help in this situation that the patient refuses to
discuss the risks but agrees to the surgery? An attempt to
assess the values he holds high may be of use in evaluating
JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY
Volume 44, Number 1 Corfield 221whether his choice not to know is internally consistent with
his higher order desires but helps little with the dilemma. If
in the course of discussion the patient reveals that life on
hemodialysis would be of very low value, one is the faced
with the dilemma of whether to reveal this possibility as a
risk. There may then be a moral duty to disclose this as a
risk, but the question is difficult. A doctor cannot force a
patient to listen, to do so may destroy the doctor-patient
relationship and any attempt must be handled very sensi-
tively. One approach may be to start with a general state-
ment such as, “I think from talking to you that there is one
particular risk you would wish to take into account,” and
proceed with disclosure, depending upon the patient’s
reaction. However, this is merely the surgeon’s opinion of
the patient’s likely values and is similar to the surgeon
acting in what he believes are the individual’s best interests.
Option B directly breaches the patient’s wishes and will
clearly undermine the doctor-patient relationship. How-
ever, the main ethical concern here is breach of confidenti-
ality, and such an option is difficult to justify ethically.
Furthermore, any information gained is subjective. The
family assessment of the patient’s best interests may be a
better guess than the surgeon’s, but it cannot be a true
representation of best interests and pales against the harm
done to the doctor-patient relationship and the principle of
confidentiality should this approach be adopted.
From the above arguments, option C is an ethically
questionable approach. Many surgeons may be uncomfort-
able with nondisclosure of a real risk of death or serious
life-affecting complications such as being rendered dialysis-
dependent, but their discomfort is not at issue here. Option
C is certainly an understandable choice but needs to be
balanced against the patient’s desire not to know. How-
ever, the argument that a real risk of death is so important
as to be essential to consent holds particular weight in
aneurysm surgery because most repairs are undertaken as
prophylactic procedures to avoid death by rupture, rather
than treat symptoms, so not to discuss risk of perioperative
death is somewhat tautologous.
Option D sounds appealing, but is very difficult and
time-consuming to implement and provides only subjective
information as interpreted by the surgeon. Particularly
given the inevitable surgical bias to operate when in a
patient’s best medical interests, the surgeon is unlikely to
uncover values held by the patient that would convince him
that not operating is a beneficient option and that he wouldbe able to present in an unbiased manner to the patient.
Any benefit that might possibly be gained would be mini-
mal in most cases, and the surgeon’s time might be better
spent elsewhere (another ethical consideration!). This op-
tion may be of more value if a patient refuses and the
surgeon believes this is genuinely not in the patient’s best
medical and personal interest and wishes to investigate
further.
Option E seems unreasonable and ethically unneces-
sary, but one also has to take into account the doctor’s
personal and professional opinion. If he truly feels ethically
unable to operate on this patient, he must ensure that the
patient’s medical care does not suffer and that he is swiftly
referred to a willing colleague. The patient’s refusal to
discuss risks is not sufficient justification to withhold med-
ically beneficial and potentially life-saving surgical interven-
tion.
On the above arguments, option A has much merit as
the patient has autonomously deferred the decision and
understands in broad terms that this is a major operation
and decision. Evidence suggests that even those patients
who do accept risk disclosure in reality follow an “entrust-
ment model”3 rather than weighing the risks and reaching
an autonomous decision with reference to their higher
order desires and individual values. However, Katz’s7 ca-
veat should be heeded: “[a] patient’s waiver of the physi-
cian’s obligation to disclose and obtain the patient’s con-
sent should be accepted only after a committed effort has
been made to explore the underlying reasons for the pa-
tient’s abdication of decision-making responsibility.”
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